NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 42 | Number 4

Article 13

6-1-1964

Real Property -- Implied Warranties in New
Housing
Richard L. Burrows

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Burrows, Real Property -- Implied Warranties in New Housing, 42 N.C. L. Rev. 946 (1964).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol42/iss4/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

submission of the state law question to state determination."'" This
indiscriminate use of the abstention technique and the consequent
time and expense involved in getting back into federal court assuredly amount to a partial abdication of federal jurisdiction. 2
The use of the federal courts in these situations is effectively removed from those who do not have the time or the money for such
a long, expensive effort. The abstention doctrine is so entrenched
today that it is doubtful that any changes will be made in its application despite the objectionable features mentioned here. The lawyer,
however, should keep these possible results in mind and let them be
his guideposts in deciding whether or not to carry his case to the
federal courts.
ROBERT B. LONG, JR.
Real Property-Implied Warranties in New Housing
In a recent Colorado case,1 the purchaser of a house brought suit
against the vendor-builder for loss suffered as a result of the defective condition of the house. Prior to the purchase of the then incompleted house, plaintiff inspected the property and noted that
caissons were being constructed for the foundation of the adjoining
house. Upon inquiry about soil conditions, defendant assured plaintiff that similar precautions had already been taken in the construction of his house. After accepting the deed and entering into possession, plaintiff-vendee discovered that the foundation was inadequate for the type of soil involved. The Supreme Court of Colorado
held the builder liable for breach of a implied warranty of fitness
for habitation.2
" Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28
(1959).
" "Delay which the Pullman doctrine sponsors, keeps the status quo
entrenched and renders 'a defendant's judgment' even in the face of constitutional requirements....
[L]itigants seeking the protection of the federal
courts for assertion of their civil rights will be ground down slowly by the
passage of time and the expenditure of money in state proceedings, leaving
the ultimate remedy here, at least in many cases, an illusory one." England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436-37 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
1 Glisan v. Smolenske, Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963). The defendantvendor was held liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
habitability when cracks began appearing in the surfaces of the house.
2 The principal case involved a contract to purchase a house then in
the process of construction; however, although the court allowed recovery
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In the past and to a large extent today, the purchaser of a house
that proves unsuitable for habitation finds his effort to redress the
wrong blocked by the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.4

Al-

though this doctrine has for all practical purposes disappeared from
the law of sales involving chattels,5 a purchaser of real property who
fails or is unable to obtain an express warranty of fitness in the deed
is faced with "the almost universal rule the country over.., that in
the sale of ...[real property] there is no implied warranty on the
part of the vendor of fitness, condition or quality.""
Realizing that the objective of the vendee in purchasing the
house is to live in it, and recognizing that the essence of the contract
is that the house should be fit for habitation, some courts have
allowed recovery on the basis of implied warranty despite the strictures of caveat emptor.7 In liberalizing the traditional doctrine, however, these courts have restricted implied warranties to cases where
the contract was for the construction of a house or for the purchase
of a house in the process of construction.'
Conversely, the doctrine
of caveat emptor is applied where the contract involves the purchase
on the basis of an implied warranty, their reasons for doing so leaves some
doubt as to possible future applications. The court emphasized and seemed
to accord a great deal of weight to the fact that the contract, by its provisions,
set out an express warranty of workmanship, i.e., "house to be completed in
workmanlike manner." - Colo. at -, 387 P.2d at 261. This leaves open
the question of whether it would hold the same way in the absence of such
a contract.
8
Although a few courts distinguish an implied warranty of "fitness"
from one of "habitability" when a sale of chattels is involved, for the purpose
of this note they are used interchangeably as applied to real property. Both
refer to whether or not the dwelling is reasonably fit for occupancy as a
dwelling.
' See generally 4 WIU-IsTox, CONTRACTS § 926, (rev. ed. 1936).
'See UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 13-16; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2314, 2-315.
'Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 300, 188 N.E.2d 780, 785
(1963). In the absence of express warranties in the deed, or of fraud or
concealment, a builder who sells a completed house is thereafter not liable to
the purchaser for damages resulting from latent defects. Gilbert Constr.
Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957) ; Levy v. C. Young Constr.
Co., 46 N.J. Super 293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957); Vanderschrier v.
Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Shapiro v. Kornicks,
103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore.
479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
"Glisan v. Smolenske, -

Colo. -,

387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M

Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill.
App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Laurel
Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948); Vanderschrier
v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Banks v. City of
Ardmore, 188 Okla. 611, 112 P.2d 372 (1941).
8
E.g., Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957);
Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
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secondhand. 9

of a fully completed structure, whether "new" or
The
courts reason that the vendee of an incomplete structure is unable
to inspect it and therefore must rely entirely upon the vendorbuilder's representations, whereas the vendee of a fully completed
structure has an opportunity to inspect the premises himself and thus
need not rely upon the vendor's representations.1 °
When a court desires to allow recovery but is reluctant to overrule the well established principle of caveat emptor," the major
obstacle to recovery under a warranty theory is that the provisions of
the antecedent contract are ordinarily merged in the deed upon its
acceptance and thereby constitute prima facie the final and entire
obligation of the parties.'
The doctrine of merger is supported on
the theory that had the parties intended to provide warranties, the
deed would or should have provided written stipulations to that
effect.' 3 If it appears that the deed purported to cover the subjectmatter of the contract, although possibly inconsistent with it, merger
should occur. This follows because, as a rule, the acceptance of a
deed is prima facie an execution of the antecedent contract.1 4 The
'E.g., Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963);
Shapiro
v. the
Kornicks,
Ohio App.
49, completed
124 N.E.2dor175
(1955).
" That
ability 103
to inspect
a fully
a secondhand
house is
at best a somewhat dubious distinction is shown by the following cases,
which allowed recovery despite the fact that various contracts for purchase
contained recitals of inspection and nonreliance on representations. Rothstein v. Janss Inv. Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941); Cohen
v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Wolford v. Freeman, 150
Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98 (1948). The reasoning of these cases was that
the ability to inspect gave the vendee no more assurance than failure to
inspect would, because normally a vendee is unable to discover such defects
as insufficient foundations, leaking roofs, or defective material at the time
the contract was entered into.
"' For a discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The
Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
12 Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517, 161 So. 526 (1935); Duncan v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953); Percifield v. Rosa, 122 Colo.
167, 220 P.2d 546 (1950); Gabel v. Simmons, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777
(1930); Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946); Huffman v.
Landes, 163 Va. 652, 177 S.E. 200 (1934) ; Dunseath v. Hallauer, 41 Wash.
2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953).
" This reasoning assumes that the parties intended to do so and that the
vendee could afford to pay for the inclusion of such warranties in the deed.
Such warranties might well make the cost so prohibitive so as to prevent
their4 inclusion.
In Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82, 64 P.2d 377 (1936),
it was stated, "in the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipulations in contracts for the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be
merged in a subsequently delivered and accepted deed made in pursuance
of such contract, to wit: (1) Those that inhere in the very subject-matter
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fact that some of the contract provisions were incorporated in the
deed, while others were modified or left out, lends even more weight
to the existing prima facie case in that the parties dealt with these
antecedent agreements selectively.' 5
Some jurisdictions have held that such a merger does not occur."'
They reason that it was not within the contemplation or intention
of the parties that the antecedent contract be entirely merged or
superceded.17 Thus, when the antecedent contract contains provisions relating to quality, fitness or conditions which impose obligations on the vendor collateral to the provisions concerning title, possession, quantity, or emblements, provisions normally found in deeds,
so as to indicate that their omission from the deed was not intended
as a release of the vendor's obligation, such collateral provisions
should not be merged. Since an implied warranty that the house
will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose is a part of the antecedent contract by implication of law, it follows that such an implication is "collateral" to the deed and should survive acceptance there8
of.1
of the deed, such as title, possession, emblements... ; (2) those carried into
the deed and of the same effect; (3) those of which the subject-matter conflicts with the same subject-matter in the deed. In such cases, the deed alone
must be looked to in determining the rights of the parties." "Id. at 88, 64 P.2d
at 381. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 413 (1932) states that "the acceptance
of a deed of conveyance of land ...discharges the contractual duties of the
seller to the party so accepting. ..
" except such duties as are "collateral" to
the main purpose of the contract.
"E.g., Duncan v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953) ; Gabel
v. Simmons, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777 (1930); Huffman v. Landes, 163 Va.
652, 177 S.E. 200 (1934).
" The following promises survived acceptance of the deed as they were
held to be "collateral" and not intended by the parties to be merged therein:

South Texas Land Co. v. Sorensen, 199 Iowa 699, 202 N.W. 552 (1925)

(improvements); Saville v. Chalmers, 76 Iowa 325, 41 N.W. 30 (1888)

(warranty of quality of the soil); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191

Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948) (warranty of description); Levin v. Cook, 186
Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946) (warranty of fitness of heating plant); Hill v.
Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951) (warranty of fitness of
freezer plant); Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W._d 225 (Tex. Civ.
App.) (warranty-of sufficiency of foundation), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d
922 (1944). See note 20 infra.
E.g., Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
"[I]f the delivery of the deed is only one of a number of things to be
performed under the terms of the contract, the delivery of the deed constitutes
part performance, and the other matters to be performed remain obligatory."
Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (1963). However,
in Robbins v. C. W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884
(1960), the court allowed recovery for breach of contract, thereby avoiding
the question of whether or not the provisions of the antecedent contract were
merged in the deed. This theory of recovery seems well established in
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Two courts have faced this problem of defective housing squarely, refusing to allow the complications of caveat emptor and merger
to obscure the need for effective relief.1" In Loma Vista Dev. Co. v.
Johnson," a case involving a new house completed before the contract to purchase, the court implied a warranty, saying, "by offering
the house for sale as a new and complete structure... [the vendorbuilder] impliedly warranted that it was properly constructed and
of good material... ."" This case is a notable departure from the
normal holding because it extends implied warranty to its logical
extreme to include a completed dwelling as well as a dwelling in the
process of construction, and it implied the warranty without the aid
or effect of any express provisions in the contract.
Because of the difficulty in applying the merger rule,2 2 the harshness of caveat emptor, and a hesitancy to invoke the apparently
limitless theory of implied warranties,23 some courts have adapted
such accepted theories as fraud, mistake or misrepresentation to
hold a vendor liable where the vendee has been led to accept a house
North Carolina in that the Robbins case cited and followed earlier cases also
allowing recovery for breach of contract. See also Childress v. C. W. Myers
Trading Post, Inc., 247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E.2d 391 (1957).
" Sterbcow v. Peres, 222 La. 850, 64 So. 2d 195 (1953); Loma Vista Dev.
Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180

S.W.2d 922 (1944). See note 20 infra. In Sterbcow it was held that
an implied warranty was created by all sales unless expressly excluded,
or the defect was discoverable by a reasonable inspection. However,
in taking a position contrary to the common law view of caveat emptor,
the court was guided by a statute which permitted "the avoidance of a sale
on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders its use
so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would
not have purchased it, had he known of the vice." LA. CiT. CODE ANN. art.
2520 (1952).
" 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922
(1944). Here, the trial court entered judgment for the purchaser. The

court of civil appeals remanded because there was no proof of a legal measure
of damages, but held that the builder's agent had authority to represent facts
in regard to the foundation because the builder "impliedly warranted that it
was properly constructed and of good material .... "

177 S.W.2d at 227.

The supreme court reversed both lower courts, holding that the agent had
no authority to represent facts in regard to the foundation. It failed to discuss the implied warranty found by the court of civil appeals.
"11d. at 227. See note 20 supra.
See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text. It is not evident in those
22

cases in North Carolina that allow recovery for breach of contract that the

court is circumventing the merger rule, as it is never discussed.
2242 N.C.L. Ruv. 468 (1964).
This note shows to some extent the apparently unlimited applications of the warranty theories by holding a cigarette
manufacturer liable for lung cancer.
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which varies from the contract stipulations.2 4 North Carolina is
among these states.2 5
A typical statement of the North Carolina view is as follows:
"ordinarily, the maxim of caveat emptor applies equally to sales of
real and personal property, and will be adhered to where there is no
fraud."2 6 The fraud necessary for vendor liability may be committed by a suppression of the truth as well as by a false representation or suggestion."
The crux of the problem in respect to fraud
in housing construction has been the question of how much the
2,See cases cited in 23 Am. JuR. Fraud and Deceit § 169 (1939).

Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757, 759, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900).
' Where liability is based on "suppression of the truth," the rule generally
followed is that "where material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and
he knows them not to be within the reach of diligent attention, observation and
judgment of the purchaser, the vendor is bound to disclose such facts, and
make them known to the purchaser." Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253
N.C. 214, 217, 116 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1960). Fraud may also be committed by
means of deceptive statements or conduct which are intended to create an
erroneous impression in another's mind to thereby induce some act or forebearance with reference to property rights to his disadvantage. Mitchell v.
Strickland, 207 N.C. 141, 176 S.E. 468 (1934). Thus "half-truths" which
are meant to be and are reasonably relied upon fall within this category.
Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 62 S.E. 1067 (1908). When,
however, a vendor represents or implies that the house has been constructed
according to specifications agreed to by the vendee, North Carolina applies a
different test to determine whether or not the representation or implication
'

is such as will allow recovery. Assuming falseness established, in order to
recover under this theory the vendee would have to show that: (1) he
reasonably relied on the false representation to his detriment; (2) they
constituted a material inducement to the contract; and (3) he acted with
ordinary prudence. Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757, 36 S.E. 153 (1900).
In addition, if the vendee could further prove that the vendor had by some
artifice concealed the defect, his case would be materially strengthened. In
Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 233 (1872), it was stated that if the defect is patent
and the vendee accepts the representation and acts upon it "with his eyes
open," the rule of caveat emptor applies "unless... [the vendee] has been
prevented from making proper inquiry by some artifice or contrivance of the
other party." Id. at 239. Accord, Leonard v. Southern Power Co., 155 N.C.
10, 70 S.E. 1061 (1911). An important factor to be noted is that it is
necessary for the vendee to prove that the representations were not merely
expressions of commendation, opinion or extravagant statements as to value.
Such "puffing" generally does not constitute sufficient fraud so as to impose
liability. Frey v. Middle Creek Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759, 57 S.E. 464
(1907); National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N.C. 652, 50 S.E. 306
(1905); Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P.2d 346 (1938). By applying
this test to the principal case of Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d
260 (1963), where the purchaser discovered the soil condition prior to
contracting to purchase the house, North Carolina would deny recovery on the
ground that there was no further duty owed the vendee since the necessary
elements are not present. See Brown v. Gray, 51 N.C. 103 (1858) (knowledge of the defect by the vendor); Cobb v. Fogalman, 23 N.C. 440 (1841)
(lack of knowledge by the vendee).
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vendor-builder is required to disclose when making sales. Generally,
courts have shown a liberal tendency to require "that full disclosure
of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct
demands it."2'

In Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co.,29 North Carolina's

leading case in this area, the evidence showed that the builder had
filled a large hole on the lot with trees, stumps, and limbs, then
covered the hole over without disclosing the fact. When the plaintiff
entered into possession without knowledge of the filled conditions,
the house began to settle causing doors to jam and the ceiling to crack.
The court found that such evidence made out a case of actionable
fraud sufficient to carry the case to the jury since the defect was not
apparent to the purchasers and was not within the reach of their
diligent attention and observation. The court stated that "where
material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and he knows them
not to be within the reach of the diligent attention... [and] observation of the... [vendee],"30 the vendor is required to disclose
such facts to the vendee.
It has been held, however, that the purchaser's knowledge of the
conditions of the property prior to the sale absolves the seller of any
liability for concealing the conditions from the purchaser.,, When
such a situation arises, the doctrine of implied warranty for fitness
would seem to add a useful theory for the vendee who cannot establish actionable fraud.32 The vendee in the principal case was faced
with such a situation.38 He had knowledge of the conditions of the
soil, but the measures taken to compensate for these conditions
were inadequate; thus, the plaintiff's only avenue of relief lay in
implied warranty.
Where recovery is based on fraud, mistake or misrepresentation,
it is apparent that such distinctions as whether the contract is for
the construction of a house, for a house in the process of construc28

PROSSER, TORTS § 87, at 535 (2d ed. 1955).
N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
30 Id.at 217, 116 S.E.2d at 457.
" Haddad v. Abel, 186 Cal. App. 2d 292, 8 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1960).
"In Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960), where the
purchasers were elderly women and the vendor failed to disclose that the
property consisted of filled land, the vendor was held liable for fraud. In
the principal case, however, because the vendee discovered the soil condition
prior to entering into the contract, he would be unable to recover under a
fraud theory. Nevertheless, he could recover for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness.
" Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
29253
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s4
tion, or for a new or secondhand dwelling, are no longer necessary.
In view of the large sales volume of houses already completed before
the sale and sold as "new" or secondhand dwellings, the theory of
implied warranty, unless applied without restriction, 5 does not go far
enough to give adequate protection to the vendee. It is submitted
that the traditional theories of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation
afford a vendee adequate relief, place a more substantial burden on
the vendor-builder, and effectively blunt the harshness of the common
law doctrine of caveat emptor. On the other hand, the principal
case indicates that the requirements for actionable fraud remain strict
and in many cases difficult to prove. In such a case recent decisions
in the area of implied warranties offer a promise of relief for unwary
purchasers of defective housing.
Underlying the entire area of implied warranties and the retreat
from the harshness of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of real
property is a revolution in the production of housing analogous to
earlier changes in the production of chattels which culminated in
the mass production methods we know today."6 Coinciding with
the movement toward mass production of chattels was a change in
sales law from caveat emptor toward a warranty imposed by reason
of the common or implied understanding that the article purchased
would be merchantable or of fair average quality where the buyer
relied upon the seller for determination of this fact."
With the
increased industrialization of the building industry, the mass construction of housing and corresponding demand, vendees are turning
to the courts for relief similar to that which courts were asked to give
when an improved technology first permitted the production of chattels in large quantity. 3 Courts should be frank to admit that the

" See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
" See Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.),
rev'd, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 922 (1944). See note 20 supra.
"See note 11 supra.
'T Because of a cursory inspection or a lack of knowledge of what to
inspect, many latent but material defects are not discovered. Nonetheless,
whether the defect be found in a chattel or in real property, if a court should
find it discoverable by reasonable inspection, recovery will be denied. Stevens
v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948). See generally 1 WILLISTON,
SALES § 207 (rev. ed. 1948).
" In Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959), in order to avoid
the problem of property warranties and caveat emptor, the vendee of a
new house contended that the defective heating and air conditioning system
that had been installed in the house was personalty and not realty and was
therefore governed by sales law. This theory was rejected by the court on
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old doctrines and distinctions are simply not adequate to meet the
needs of the changing technology of the building industry and the
corresponding needs of purchasers. A realistic appraisal will reveal
that the doctrine of implied warranty offers a solution to a growing
problem.
RiCHARD L. BURROWS

Securities Regulation-'"Fraud" to Include Nondisclosure
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 makes it
unlawful for an investment adviser, by the use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce, "(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client... ."I Section
209(e) of the Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
the power to bring an action for injunction, and the district courts
power to enjoin such activities, when it has been shown that "any
person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a violation of... [such] provision .... 2
Because of the general language of the antifraud provision quoted
above, it was not known what fraudulent and deceptive activities
were prohibited by this act or to what extent the Commission was
limited in this area by common law concepts of fraud and deceit,'
which would include proof of: (1) false representation of a material
fact; (2) an intent to induce reliance; (3) actual reliance on the false
4
representation; and (4) damage suffered as a result.

The meaning of the statute was clarified in the recent case of
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.5 The Commission
sought to obtain a preliminary injunction under section 206 to compel an investment advisory service and its president to disclose to
the ground that the system was a fixture and therefore governed by the
applicable realty laws.
'lnvestment Advisers Act of 1940, §§206(l)-(2), 54 Stat. 852, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1963).
' Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(e), 54 Stat. 853, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (Supp. IV 1963).
'S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960); H. REP. No. 2179,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960).
'3 Loss, SEcuriTiES REGULATION 1430 (2d ed. 1961); S. REP. No. 1760,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
375 U.S. 180 (1963).

